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The Boundaries of Legal Sociology*
Donald J. Blackt
Contemporary sociology of law is characterized by a confusion of sci-
ence and policy. Its analysis proceeds in the disembodied tongue of sci-
ence, in the language of "system," "structure," ".pattern," and "organi-
zation," or in the vocabulary of technique, of "needs," "functions," and
"viability." Rarely does the language impart emotion, indignation, or
even personal involvement on the part of the investigator. But while
legal sociology is presented in this scientific language and scientific
tone, normative considerations-the "ought" and the "just"-become
subtly implicated.
Although legal sociologists' typically criticize one another accord-
ing to the usual scientific standards of methodological precision and
theoretical validity, they frequently become preoccupied with the
"policy implications" of their research. Occasionally, in assessing one
another, they shed the mantle of science and become unabashedly
political. Recently, for instance, a sociologist characterized the litera-
ture of legal sociology as bourgeois, liberal, pluralist, and meliorist."
He went on to argue that a more radical sociology is required, one that
is "more critical in its premises and farther-reaching in its proposals."U
* This paper has benefited from the reactions of several readers: Leon Lipson,
Maureen Mileski, David Trubek, and Stanton Wheeler. In March, 1972, an early draft
occasioned an informal seminar at the Center for the Study of Law and Society of the
University of California at Berkeley. I thank the following participants in that seminar
for helping me to sharpen my ideas: David Matza, Sheldon Messinger, Philippe Nonet,
Jerome Skolnick, and Philip Selznick. Finally, I want to express appreciation to Henry M.
Fields, a law student who first suggested that I write this paper and then went on to
contribute his considerable scholarly and editorial abilities to its preparation.
t Assistant Professor of Sociology and Lecturer in Law, Yale University.
1. In what follows I shall use the term "sociologists" as a matter of convention, though
I intend to refer not only to Ph.D.'s in sociology but also to lawyers and political sclen.
tists and anyone else claiming to contribute to the scientific study of law as a social phe-
nomenon. Most of my examples, however, derive from the scholarly literature explicitly
labeled "sociology of law" and authored by academic sociologists.
2. Currie, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 134 (1971), reviewing LAW AND TilE BEIIAVIORAL
SCIENCES (L. Friedman & S. Macaulay eds. 1969) and SocIETY AND THE LEGAL ORmE (R.
Schwartz & J. Skolnick eds. 1970). These two collections of the legal sociology literature
not only collect representative materials but also attempt to explain the relevance of
the materials, thereby providing excellent examples of the style of discourse now don-
inating the field.
3. Id. at 145. A striking feature of Currie's review is that he pays little attention to
the scientific adequacy of the work he criticizes. Instead, he focuses more upon the reform
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Whether liberal or radical, however, legal sociologists tend to share
a style of discourse that deserves attention and comment.
It is my contention that a purely sociological approach to laws should
involve not an assessment of legal policy, but rather, a scientific analy-
sis of legal life as a system of behavior. The ultimate contribution of
this enterprise would be a general theory of law, a theory that would
predict and explain every instance of legal behavior. While such a
general theory may never be attained, efforts to achieve it should be
central to the sociology of law. By contrast, the core problems of legal
policymaking are problems of value. Such value considerations are as
irrelevant to a sociology of law as they are to any other scientific
theory of the empirical world.
Invoking the language of science and relying upon its aura of re-
spectability, sociologists move, in a special and almost imperceptible
way, beyond science and deal with questions of legal evaluation. Be-
cause they confuse scientific questions with policy questions, they
severely retard the development of their field. At best, they offer an
applied sociology of law-at worst, sheer ideology.
After examining the type of discourse that passes for a sociology of
law and noting its apparent shortcomings, I shall discuss more directly
the nature and aims of a pure sociology of law.
II
With one phrase, legal effectiveness, we capture the major thematic
concern of contemporary sociology of law. The wide range of work
that revolves around the legal-effectiveness theme displays a common
strategy of problem formulation, namely a comparison of legal reality
to a legal ideal of some kind. Typically a gap is shown between law-
in-action and law-in-theory. Often the sociologist then goes on to sug-
gest how the reality might be brought closer to the ideal. Law is re-
garded as ineffective and in need of reform owing to the disparity
between the legal reality and the ideal.
4
Legal-effectiveness studies differ from one another, however, in the
kinds of legal ideals against which their findings are measured. At one
implications of the existing work and condemns it on political rather than methodological
or theoretical grounds. Thus, while he suggests that the work could greatly bencit from
the perspectives of Marxian scholars, he fails to show that the Marxian approach to law
has a superior explanatory power.
4. Because research in legal sociology consistently shows these disparities, the field has
become identified with debunkery and the unmasking of law. In legal scholarship this
debunking spirit goes back to the legal realism movement which has haunted American
law schools since it emerged around the turn of the century. Much legal sociology, then.
is a new legal realism, appearing in the prudent garb of social science, armed with
sophisticated research methods, new language, and abstract theoretical constructs.
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extreme are "impact studies" that compare reality to legal ideals with
a very plain and specific operational meaning. Here the legal meas.
uring rod is likely to be a statute whose purpose is rather clearly
discernible or a judicial decision unambiguously declarative of a spe-
cific policy. The Miranda decision, for example, requiring the police
to apprise suspects of their legal rights before conducting an in-
custody interrogation, has a core meaning about which consensus is
quite high.5 Soon after Miranda was handed down by the Supreme
Court, research was initiated to evaluate the degree of police com-
pliance with the decision. 6 When the core meaning of a decision thus
is clear, this type of research can be expected to show whether or not
a decision has, in fact, been implemented.
Sociologists, however, may launch these implementation studies
where legislation or judicial opinion is considerably more ambiguous
than in Miranda. In such instances, the "impact" may be difficult to
measure. What must be done, for example, to implement In re Gault?'
Though it is generally recognized that Gault guarantees to juvenile
suspects constitutional rights previously accorded only to adults, the
extent of these juvenile rights is not at all clear.8 Hence it becomes
difficult, perhaps impossible, to identify the degree to which Gault
has been implemented.9
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although there may be some disagreement
as to the peripheral meanings of "custody" and "interrogation" (see, e.g., Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968); Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969)), there is little doubt
that a suspect under arrest in a police station who is probingly questioned about his In-
volvement in a crime is both in custody and under interrogation as these concepts are
used by the Court. Moreover, no question remains as to the required content of an appris-
ing of rights. 384 U.S. at 478-79. Yet, there may even be disagreement as to what consti-
tutes an "adequate" and "effective" apprising of rights. Id. at 167. Compare United States
v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968), with State V. Renfrew, 280 Minn. 276, 159 NAV.2d 111
(1968). For example, would a police procedure of giving the suspect a preprinted card
listing his rights meet the requirement of an adequate and effective apprisal Would that
procedure meet the Miranda test if the suspect were illiterate?
6. See, e.g., Project, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALEa
L.J. 1519 (1967).
7. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8. See generally Foster, Notice and "Fair Procedure": Revolution or Simple Revision?,
in GAULT, WHAT Now FOR THE JUVENILE COURT? 51 (V. Nordin ed. 1968). For examples of
judicial conflict in the applicability of specific rights, compare: (1) Stanley v. Peyton, 292
F. Supp. 213 (W.D. Va. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970) (dictum) and State v. Acuna,
78 N.M. 119, 428 P.2d 658 (1967), with Steinhauer v. State, 206 So.2d 25 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App.
1967), quashed and remanded on other grounds, 216 So.2d 214 (1968), cert. denled, 898
U.S. 914 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting on denial of cert.) (right to counsel at waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction hearing); (2) In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 364 (1968),
cert. denied, 396 US. 852 (1969), with In re D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183, 290 N.Y.S.2d 935
(1968) (necessity of giving Miranda warnings to both juvenile and parents at pre-trial
custodial interrogation); (3) In re Wylie, 231 A.2d 81 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967), with In re
Urbasek, 38 Ill.2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967) (right to standard of proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt).
9. See, e.g., Lefstein, Stapleton, & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and
its Implementation 3 L. & Soc. REv. 491 (1969), in which these problems of operationalliza.
tion are evident.
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Finally, the sociologist may attempt to compare legal reality to an
ideal grounded in neither statutory nor case law. Here the investigator
assesses his empirical materials against standards of justice such as "the
rule of law," "arbitrariness," "legality," or a concept of "due process"
not explicitly anchored in the due process clause of the Constitution.
Jerome Skolnick, for instance, asserts that the police employ the in-
former system in narcotics enforcement "irrespective of the constraints
embodied in principles of due process."' 0 But there is no indication
of where Skolnick locates these principles. Presumably he realizes that
no court in the United States has declared the practice illegal, and
there is no reason to think such a decision is likely in the near future.,,
In another study, Skolnick investigates plea-bargaining in the court-
room, concluding that the cooperation underlying this practice "de-
viates" from some unarticulated adversarial ideal. 2 Similarly, Leon
Mayhew, in arguing that the Massachusetts Commission Against Dis-
crimination failed to define discrimination adequately and thereby
ignored much illegal conduct, provides neither a legal argument nor
an empirical referent for his interpretation of the Commission's proper
mission. 13 In short, then, some studies in legal sociology seem to move
beyond the law when they measure legal reality against an ideal.
At its most useful, legal-effectiveness research may be valuable to
people in a position to reform the legal order. In this sense it consists
of studies in applied sociology of law. This would appear to be par-
ticularly true of those investigations that relate empirical findings to
legal ideals which are clearly expressed in the written law. Such re-
search might provide legal reformers with a kind of leverage for
change, though the mere evidence of a gap between law-in-action and
law-in-theory would not in itself overwhelm all resistance to change.
10. J. SKoulacK, JusricE WrrHouT TRIAL 1-8 (1966).
11. Much less than viewing the use of informers as a violation of constitutional safe-
guards, the Supreme Court has refused even to require that an informer's identity be
revealed. Specifically, police reliance upon anonymous informants to provide the requisite
information for probable cause to sustain an arrest or search warrant has been held not to
violate either the Fourth Amendment or due process clause. See McCray v. Illinois, 386
U.S. 300 (1967); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Information supplied by
an unnamed informer of apparent reliability under certain circumstances may provide
sufficient cause for a search without a warrant. Adams v. Williams, 40 U.S.L.W. 4724
(US. June 12, 1972). But if the police utilize an informant as a participant in an illegal
narcotics transaction, even where there is no question of entrapment the government will
be required to disclose the identity of the informant at trial when such disclosure may
be "relevant and helpful to the accused's defense." The failure to disclose in this context
would violate due process. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
12. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. Co.rucr R1 OLUnon 52
(1967).
13. L. MAYHEW, LAw AND EQUAL OPPORTUNrrY (1969), reviewed, Black, Book Review,
40 Soc. INQUIRY 179 (1970). See Mayhew, Teleology and Values in the Social System:
Reply to Donald J. Black, 40 Soc. INQUIRY 182 (1970).
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Who can imagine a study, after all, that would not discover such a
gap? Little is more predictable about the law than that these gaps exist.
However, legal-effectiveness research sometimes moves beyond ap-
plied sociology. When legal reality is compared to an ideal with no
identifiable empirical referent, such as "the rule of law" or "due
process," the investigator may inadvertently implant his personal ideals
as the society's legal ideals. At this point social science ceases and
advocacy begins. The value of legal-effectiveness research of this kind
is bound to be precarious, for it involves, perhaps unwittingly, moral
judgment at the very point where it promises scientific analysis.
III
As I have described it, the sociology of law significantly resembles
a broader style of thought that has come to be known as technocratic
thought,' 4 or, to use an earlier term, scientism. In the technocratic
world-view, every problem-factual, moral, political, or legal-reduces
to a question of technique. A good technique is one that works, and
what works can be learned through science. Any problem that cannot
be solved in this way is no problem at all, hardly worthy of our atten-
tion. In theory, moreover, every problem can be solved if only the
appropriate expertise is applied to it. Among the key words in the
technocratic vocabulary are efficiency and, one I noted earlier, effec-
tiveness. It is a style of thought in some respects akin to pragmatism,
but it is a pragmatism with unstated goals, a search for the most ra-
tional way to go somewhere that is never clearly specified. Rather,
we must infer what these goals are, and that is how some technocratic
approaches come to be known as liberal and bourgeois, others as
radical and critical. Technocrats do not make political arguments in
the usual sense; they do not moralize. They simply want to get the
job done.
The technocratic style dominates much discussion of social con-
troversy at the higher reaches of American life. We are given to under-
stand that scientific research will reveal whether marijuana should be
legalized, that the Vietnam War was a miscalculation, and that eco-
nomic analysis will determine the most "rational" tax program. The
new nations of Africa and Asia are studied to determine what their
modernization "requires." Riots, violence, and pornography give rise
to government study commissions and research grants for the univer-
sities. Moral problems of every sort are translated into problems of
14. For a recent discussion of technocratic thought, see T. RoszAK, TilE MAKING OF A
COUNTER CULTURE 5-22 (1969).
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knowledge and science, of know-how. To discuss the criminal in the
moral terms of right and wrong comes to be seen as primitive and
unschooled; medical terminology is introduced into the discussion of
the treatment of criminal offenders. In the name of science and
progress, what was once seen as evil is studied and treated, not con-
demned.
The logic of this technocratic mentality has helped to catapult
sociology to a position of some prominence in these times of rapid
social change and conflict. Sociology, it is thought, will point the way
to solutions to the many problems before us. The sociologists them-
selves have shown little reluctance to accept this responsibility. The
typical sociologist knows almost nothing about moral or social philoso-
phy, but if public policy is no more than a matter of scientific tech-
nique, why should he? In a technocratic era, moral philosophy is an
oddity in the real world of action, a quaint remnant of the nineteenth
century, something for the undergraduates.
IV
Law can be seen as a thing like any other in the empirical world.
It is crucial to be clear that from a sociological standpoint, law con-
sists in observable acts, not in rules as the concept of rule or norm is
employed in both the literature of jurisprudence and in every-day
legal language.15 From a sociological point of view, law is not what
lawyers regard as binding or obligatory precepts, but rather, for ex-
ample, the observable dispositions of judges, policemen, prosecutors,
or administrative officials.1" Law is like any other thing in the sense
that it is as amenable to the scientific method as any other aspect of
reality. No intellectual apparatus peculiar to the study of law is re-
quired. At the same time, a social science of law true to positivism,
the conventional theory of science, cannot escape the limitations in-
herent in scientific thought itself.17 Perhaps a word should be said
about these limitations.
15. Hence this sociological concept of law is very different from and not logically in-
compatible with the legal positivism of Hans Kelsen and his "pure theory of law." See,
e.g., H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1945). Similarly, to take another well-
known example, a -sociological approach does not conflict with the rule.oriented juris-
prudence of H.L.A. Hart in THE CoNcEar OF Liw (1961).
At the level of social life in its narrow sense, law is behavior and nothing more. If the
concept of rule or norm is used in a sociological analysis, it should always refer to a
behavioral pattern of some kind. See, e.g., E. DuRKnru.-, The Determination of Moral
Facts, in SocioLoGY AND PHILOSOPHY 35-62 (D.F. Pocock transl. 1953).
16. At a later point, I shall propose a sociological definition of law. See p. 1096 infra.
17. A good introduction to positivism is L. KoLnowsK!, THE AuLENAT1oN OF REASoN:
A HIsTORY OF Posrnvmsr THouGRT (N. Guterman transl. 1968).
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Within the tradition of positivist philosophy, three basic principles
of scientific knowledge can be noted. First, science can know only
phenomena and never essences.1s The quest for the one correct con-
cept of law or for anything else "distinctively legal" is therefore in-
herently unscientific. 19 The essence of law is a problem for jurispru-
dence, not science. Second, every scientific idea requires a concrete
empirical referent of some kind.20 A science can only order experi-
ence, and has no way of gaining access to non-empirical domains of
knowledge. Accordingly, insofar as such ideals as justice, the rule of
law, and due process are without a grounding in experience, they have
no place in the sociology of law. Third, value judgments cannot be
discovered in the empirical world and for that reason are without
cognitive meaning in science.
2 1
It is for this last reason that science knows nothing and can know
nothing about the effectiveness of law. Science is incapable of an
evaluation of the reality it confronts. To measure the effectiveness of
law or of anything else for that matter, we must import standards of
value that are foreign to science.22 What is disturbing about the con-
temporary literature on legal effectiveness then is not that it evaluates
law,2 3 but rather, that its evaluations and proposals are presented as
18. " This has been called the principle of phenomenalism. See id. at 3-4.
19. Philip Selznick, one of the most ambitious and influential students of legal effec.
tiveness, considers the "cardinal weakness" of the sociological approach to law to be Its
"failure to offer a theory of the distinctively legal." Selznick, The Sociology of Law, 9 IN-
TERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 51 (D.L. Sills ed. 1968).
20. This is the principle of nominalism. See KoLAKOWSnI, supra note 17, at 5-7.
21. Id. at 7-8. Some legal sociologists are willing to tolerate an obfuscation of factual
and normative discourse. Selznick, for instance, while conceding that the separation of
fact and value has some merit, nevertheless suggests that this distinction is meant for
"unsophisticated minds." We must, he continues, unlearn this "easy and reassuring"
formula from our "intellectual youth." Selznick finds a natural-law approach more appro-
priate for the mature thinker. Selznick, Sociology and Natural Law, 6 NATURAL L.F. 86
(1961).
22. This does not say that scientific studies of legal effectiveness are impossible. As
long as a social goal is introduced into the analysis and is adequately defined for purposes
of the investigation, the study of effectiveness is perfectly feasible. Such applied science
can be as rigorously conducted as any other research. Cf. pp. 1089-90 supra.
23. As a rule I do not personally find the policy criticisms and proposals of legal
sociologists to be particularly objectionable, the exception being those proposals that
increase the power of the government to intervene in citizens' lives. Thus, for instance,
I find the therapeutic approach to criminal offenders a frightening advance of an already
too powerful criminal justice system. In fact, I align myself more broadly and precisely
in the philosophical tradition of anarchism. For me, the validity of law is at all times
contingent upon my own assessment of its moral validity, and thus I recognize no a priori
legitimacy in the rule of law. For a brief introduction to this political ethic, see R. WOLVI',
IN DEFENCE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
I would add that the students of legal effectiveness I am discussing are, politically
speaking, the elite of our society, however critical of the legal process they may seem.
Indeed, the government often finances their research on its own effectiveness. It Is my
view that the confusion of fact and value operates as a form of mystification that helps
to keep the established order intact. Nevertheless, I do not wish to use my status as a
scientist to promote my political philosophy. See M. WEBER, FROMt MAX WEBER.: ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGY 129-56 (H.H. Gerth & C.W. Mills transl. and eds. 1958).
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scientific findings. Far from denying this confusion, Philip Selznick
has gone so far in the opposite direction as to claim that "nothing we
know today precludes an effort to define 'ends proper to man's nature'
and to discover objective standards of moral judgment."2 5
Legal sociologists involved in the study of effectiveness have thus
come to advance a conception of scientific criticism of law. This is
illogical; it is a contradiction in terms.
It is apparent by now that my critique of contemporary legal so-
ciology is premised on the notion that sociology is a scientific enter-
prise and, as such, can be distinguished from moral philosophy, juris-
prudence, or any other normatively oriented study-in other words,
that the study of fact can be distinguished from the study of value.
This is not to say that I am unaware of the criticisms that have been
levied against a purely value-free social science. But while accepting
these criticisms, I cannot understand the conclusion that the effort
to develop an objective science of man should be abandoned.
It is important to understand precisely how values become involved
in social science. One widely recognized intrusion of values occurs at
the first stage of scientific inquiry: the choice of the problem for
study. The values of the investigator may determine, for example,
whether he selects a problem with great relevance for public policy
or one of wholly academic interest. This intrusion of values was long
ago noted by Max Weber, perhaps the most illustrious proponent of
value-free sociology. Weber contended that the role of values in the
choice of a problem is unavoidable and should be faced squarely, but
he insisted that the problem, once selected, could and should be pur-
sued "non-evaluatively."
2 6
But I would go further than Weber and grant that these value orien-
tations may bias the analysis of the problem as well as its selection.
Though various methodological techniques have been developed to
minimize the effects of these biases, good social science still requires
a disciplined disengagement on the part of the investigator-so dis-
ciplined, in fact, that it may rarely be achieved. Various arguments
can be made to the effect that bias is built into social science at its
very foundations. For example, the claim has been made that every
social science study necessarily implicates the investigator in the per-
spective of an actual hierarchical position, seeing social life from
24. See note 19 supra.
25. Selznick, supra note 21, at 93-94.
26. See M. WVEER, THE IErHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL ScwECEs 21-22 (E.A. Shils &
HA. Finch transls. 1949). For a direct attack on Weber's approach to these questions,
see Gouldner, Anti-Minotaur: The Myth of a Value.Free Sociology, 9 Soc. 'O1n3LIS
199 (1962).
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either the social top or the bottom, and is therefore inherently biased. "7
For purposes of discussion I grant even this. Similarly it is arguable
that all social science is, beyond science, a form of ideology, if only
because it is by its nature an instance of social behavior subject to
the scrutiny of the very discipline of which it is a part. Sociology, that
is, can be analyzed sociologically. Sociology does not occur in a vacuum
and is undoubtedly influenced by social forces. Accordingly, sociology
may be viewed as ideology supporting either the defenders of the status
quo or their opponents.
28
Finally, because much social science can be interpreted in an ideo-
logical framework, its theories and findings can be used as weapons
in the arena of public policymaking. The polemical impact of social
science may be particularly great at this historical moment, given the
enormous prestige of science in modern society. Not only do these
theories and findings feed into existing policy debates, but they also
can stimulate controversy and change by drawing attention to empirical
situations that 'might otherwise be unknown or ignored by policy-
makers and social critics. Thus social science performs-willingly or
not-an intelligence function in the political process. 20 Because of such
political ramifications, the argument has been put forward that the
sociologist remains responsible for the consequences of his work. Only
by making an explicit moral commitment can the social scientist hope
to protect himself and others from the unintended consequences of
his work.3 0 It is apparent that social science resonates into the realm
of ideology, thereby raising serious questions about the scholar's re-
sponsibilities to his fellow man.
In several senses, then, values enter into the activity of social science.
While values may play a similar role in science of all kinds, it can at
least be admitted that their role is especially visible and dramatic when
man is studying himself. Values may be all the more prominent in the
27. Becker, Whose Side Are We On?, 14 Soc. PROBLEMS 239 (1967).
28. This is a major theme of a recent critique of sociological theory. See A. GOULDNLR,
THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY (1970).
29. It should be clear that the policy impact of science is never direct but is always
mediated by normative analysis, whether explicit or implicit. Policy cannot be deduced
from scientific propositions alone. All of this is dramatically illustrated by the relation
between the Marxian theory and public policy. Surely no theory of social science has had
more impact upon the world. It has been an important weapon in ideological debate, and
it has alerted policymakers and the public to the situation of the working class and the
role of class conflict in social change. Yet as a scientific theory the Marxian analysis of
society and history has no logical implications for political action. Without passing judg
ment upon the exploitation and growing misery of the proletariat, one could just as well
sit back passively and watch history unfold as join the revolution. Both responses are
logically independent of the theory.
30. R. DAHRENDORF, Values and Social Science: The Value Dispute in Perspective, In
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIETY 17 (1968).
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study of man's moral life, of which legal sociology is one branch. The
major arguments against the possibility of a pure science of man, in
short, seem to have some merit.31 But the crucial question is what all
of this implies for the traditional distinction between fact and value.
I say it implies nothing. In fact, much of the criticism of value-free
sociology itself rests upon observable patterns of value impact upon
social science and for that reason relies upon the fact-value distinction
for its own validity.
We have seen that a social scientist may be affected by values in the
choice of his problem and may be biased in his approach to it. Critics
of a value-free social science assert that these psychological effects,
along with the ideological character of social science when viewed as
the object of analysis itself, undermine the validity of social science.
But this is to confuse the origins and uses of a scientific statement with
its validity.3 2 The fact that scientific statements are influenced by
values does not make them value statements. The psychological and
social influence of values on scientific inquiry has no logical implica-
tions for the validity of a scientific proposition. Its validity is deter-
mined only by empirical verification. A value statement, by contrast,
is not subject to such a test.3 3 How, for example, is the following state-
ment to be empirically verified: "Democratic process is an ultimate
good"? The fact that we can distinguish between scientific proposi-
tions and such value statements is all we need to assert the possibility
31. Of course in this brief discussion I cannot begin to review the sizable literature
on the subject. Perhaps I should note, however, one criticism of the value.neutral strategy
that bears directly on the study of law-one, moreover, that seems to me to be wholly
without merit. This criticism asserts that the study of normative life, because it is norma-
tive, requires a partially normative approach on the part of the investigator if he is to
comprehend its empirical character. The investigator must take the nornative view of
the participants if he is to understand their normative behavior. Selznick, for instance
suggests that the sociologist should make an "assessment" of the degree to which a norma-
tive system reaches an ideal "from the standpoint of the normative system being studied"
though "the student of a normative system need not have any personal commnitment to
the desirability of that system." Selznick, supra note 21, at 88. In tie study of law,
therefore, it seems we must include an assessment of legal reality in terms of the ideals
of the legal system we study.
In my view this argument incorrectly assumes that such normative ideals can be identi-
fied at a wholly empirical level. I do not believe, for example, that the degree of con-
formity of law with, let us say, a constitutional ideal, is a wholly empirical question. The
nature of the ideal is itself a normative question, a question of normative interpretation.
In the study of law such interpretation is the heart of legal scholarship, and from a
positivist standpoint that activity is, at its core, normative rather than scientific. It ad-
vances an "ought" as the proper measure of reality, and it does not matter whether or
not the interpreter himself subscribes to the "ought." It remains an unavoidably norma-
tive judgment. In effect, then, Selznick's view is that in order to understand normative
life we must be normative. This view, I believe, is a non sequitur.
32. See DAHRENDORF, supra note 30, at 9-10.
33. Although not subject to empirical verification, a value statement ma' be subject
to other criteria such as its logical status in relation to a more general axiological prin-
ciple.
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of social science. In short, values may affect social science profoundly,
but that is no reason to abandon the enterprise. 34
V
The proper concern of legal sociology should be the development
of a general theory of law. A general theory involves several key ele-
ments that may not at first be obvious. To say that a theory of law is
general means that it seeks to order law wherever it is found. It seeks
to discover the principles and mechanisms that predict empirical pat-
terns of law, whether these patterns occur in this day or the past, re-
gardless of the substantive area of law involved and regardless of the
society. By contrast, the contemporary study of law is ideographic, very
concrete and historical. Legal scholars tend to rebel at the suggestion
of a general theory of their subject matter. Nevertheless, unless we
seek generality in our study of law, we abandon hope for a serious
sociology of law.
If the sweep of legal sociology is to be this broad, a correspondingly
broad concept of law is required. I like to define law simply as gov-
ernmental social control.35 This is one possibility among many con-
sistent with a positivist strategy. It is a concept easily employed in
cross-societal analysis, encompassing any act by a political body that
concerns the definition of social order or its defense. At the same time
it excludes such forms of social control as popular morality and bu-
reaucratic rules in private organizations. It is more inclusive than an
American lawyer might deem proper, but more selective than anthro-
34. My critique of contemporary legal sociology arises from a very conventional con-
ception of scientific method, a conception associated with the broader tradition of post.
tivist thought. I have not made and do not intend to make a philosophical defense of
this tradition. I wish only to advocate a sociology of law true to basic positivist prin-
ciples as they have come to be understood in the history of the philosophy of science.
35. I mention this only as a means of delineating the subject matter of legal sociology.
A definition of the subject matter is a prerequisite to any scientific inquiry. Just as a
physicist must first define motion before he can describe its characteristics, a sociologist
of religion, for example, must first define the pattern of social behavior that constitutes
religion before he can proceed with his research. This does not mean that there is only
one proper definition. Law itself has been defined non-normatively in a variety of ways.
See, e.g., Al. WEBER, TIlE TiIEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 127 (T. Parsons
ed. & transl. 1964):
An order will be called law when conformity with it is upheld by the probability
that deviant action will be met by physical or psychic sanctions aimed to compel
conformity or to punish disobedience, and applied by a group of men especially
empowered to carry out this function.
I have chosen "governmental social control" as a definition of law for the reasons that
follow in the text. I should add, however, that for me the choice of a particular socio-
logical concept of law is not at all critical to my larger aim, since my ultimate interest
goes beyond law per se to all forms of social control. For me, the study of law Is pre.
liminary and subordinate to the more general study of social control systems of all kinds,
Therefore, if my concept of law is too narrow or too broad it does not matter theo-
retically, since it will in any case be relevant to a sociology of social control.
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pological concepts which treat law as synonymous with normative life
and dispute settlement of every description, governmental or other-
wise. If we are to have a manageable subject matter, our concept must
construe law as one among a larger array of social control systems. And
if we are to have a strategically detached approach, our concept must
be value neutral. We need a theoretical structure applicable to the
law of the Nazis as well as American law, to revolutionary law and
colonial law as well as the cumbersome law of traditional China. What
do these systems share, and how can we explain the differences among
them?
Ultimately a theory is known and judged by its statements about
the world. These statements both guide and follow empirical research.
They propose uniformities in the relation between one part of reality
and another. Thus a general theory of law is addressed to the relation
between law and other aspects of social life, including, for instance,
other forms of social control, social stratification, the division of labor,
social integration, group size, and the structure and substance of social
networks. At the moment we have only a small inventory of theoretical
statements, or propositions, of this kind. The relevant literature is
sparse, and many of our leads must come from the classic works of
Maine,30 Durkheim,37 Weber,38 Ehrlich,30 Pound,40 and the like.
Marx, too, should not be forgotten, though he gave law only passing
attention.41 Apart from classical sociology and comparative jurispru-
dence, anthropological literature, notably the work of such scholars
as Malinowski-4 2 Hoebel,4 3 Gluckman 4 4 Bohannan,43 and Nader4 0
36. See, e.g., ANCIENT LAW (1861); VILLAGE-COMSUNITIEs IN TiE EAST AND WEsr (1871).
37. THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (G. Simpson transl. 1933); PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
AND Civic MoRALs (C. Brookfield transl. 1957); Two Laws of Penal Evolution (M. Mileski
transl. 1971) (available in my files).
38. MAX WBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (M. Rheinstcin ed., E. Shils &
M. Rheinstein transs. 1954).
39. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LmW (W. Moll transl. 1936).
40. E.g., SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942); The Limits of Effective Legal Action,
27 INT'L J. ETHICS 150 (1917); A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAnv. L. REv. 1 (1943).
41. Marx did, however, inspire some interesting sociological work on law. See, e.g.,
K. RENNER, THE INsTITUTIONS OF PRIVATE LAW AND THEIR SOCIAL FUNCTIONS (0. Kahn-
Freund ed., A. Schwartzchild transl. 1949); Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and
Marxism, in SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY III (H. Babb transl. 1951).
42. The standard work is CRIME AND CUSoTM IN SAVAGE SOciET (1926). This study is
considered the first ethnography of law.
43. THE LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954); K. LLEWAELLYN & E. HOEnEL, TILE CHEYENNE
WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMIrrIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941).
44. See, e.g., THE JuDICIAL PROCESS AaONG TE BAROTSE OF NoRTHPEN RIODESIA (1955).
Gluckman provides a useful overview of legal anthropology in PoLrIcs, LAw AND RTUAL
IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (1965).
45. JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT AMONG THE Tiv (1957); The Differing Realms of the Law,
in THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAw 33 (1965) (supplement to 67 Am. ANmrOi'oLocISr 33 (1965)).
46. E.g., An Analysis of Zapotec Law Cases, 3 E-IINOLOGY 404 (1964); Choices in Legal
Procedure: Shia Moslem and Mexican Zapotec, 67 Am. ANTHROP-OLOGIST 394 (1965).
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has contributed more than sociology to a general theory of law. Con-
temporary sociologists tend to limit their attention to the American
legal system, and even there, disproportionate emphasis is given the
criminal justice system. Rarely do they compare American law to gov-
ernmental social control in other societies; yet if legal sociology is not
comparative, its conclusions will inevitably be time-bound and ethno-
centric.
This is not to suggest that American criminal justice is unworthy
of study. But one must address problems at a higher level of generality,
thereby contributing to and benefiting from scholarship in other
realms of law. If we investigate the police, for example, our funda-
mental interest as'sociologists must be in what police work can teach
us about law, generically understood, and we must bring to a study
of the police whatever we know about other forms of legal life. From
my standpoint, in other words, the major shortcoming of most socio-
logical literature on the police is that it concerns the police alone, in-
stead of treating police behavior as an instance of law. Often sociolo-
gists occupy themselves with the unique world of the policeman, his
attitudes, hopes and fears, his relations with his fellow officers, his
social isolation in the wider community-in brief, with the "human"
dimensions of police work. 47 Insofar as such studies rise above descrip.
tive journalism or ethnography, then, they tend to focus upon the
psychology of the policeman on his day-to-day round. Yet from a purely
sociological point of view it is not important to know that policemen
are, after all, "human" or to know how their minds work. A pure
sociology of law does not study humans in the usual sense. It studies
law as a system of behavior.48 Taken in this sense, law feels nothing.
It has no joy or sorrow or wonderment. Scientifically conceived as a
social reality in its own right, law is no more human than a molecular
structure. It has no nationality, no mind, and no ends proper to its
nature.
I do not mean to criticize categorically the rather impressive body
of police research that has accumulated in recent years, but only to
suggest that its contribution to the sociology of law is limited. We
must give up the notion that the sociology of law embraces any and all
forms of empirical research relating to the legal system. A scientific
discipline is defined by its theoretical mission, by what it tries to ex-
47. E.g., SKOLNICK, supra note 10; W. WVESTLEY, VIOLENCE AND THE POLICE: A SOCIO-
LOGICAL STUDY OF LAW, CUSTOM, AND MORALITY (1970); Bittner, The Police on Shid.Roul:
A Study of Peace-Keeping, 32 Am. Soc. REV. 699 (1967); Werthmnan and Piliavin, Gang
Members and the Police, in TmE POLICE: Six SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS 56 (D. Bordua ed, 1967).
48. See p. 1091 supra.
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plain, not by its sources of data. Thus, research on the human body
may contribute to any of a variety of disciplines-biochemistry, ge-
netics, endocrinology, physiological psychology, or whatever. The same
is true of research on law or the police. Accordingly, a study of the
police contributes to legal sociology only if it provides insights into
legal behavior, its empirical profile, the social conditions under which
it occurs, and its social implications. I am not saying that every so-
ciologist must be a theorist, but only that any sociologist who does
research on a legal topic without knowing, roughly, its theoretical
relevance does so at his peril.
Police research should tell us something about the social control
function of the police: What legal matters do they handle? How do
they come to deal with those matters? What are the principles accord-
ing to which they process their cases? Ideally a study would also tell
us how police behavior resemhbles other known patterns of legal be-
havior and how it differs. We know, for example, that the police make
arrests relatively infrequently when some other form of social control
is available in the situation. Thus, they rarely make an arrest when
one family member criminally offends another, a situation where other
means of social pressure typically are at hand, whereas the same of-
fense committed by one stranger against another is very apt to result
in arrest.49 This pattern of legal behavior is known to have analogues
in a wide variety of legal settings, in civil as well as criminal cases, in
the invocation of law as well as its application, in many countries and
historical periods, and even in the evolution of law itself.50 We may
state the pattern as a theoretical proposition: Law tends to become
implicated in social life to the degree that other forms of social con-
trol are weak or unavailable.51 Hence, what we discover in the be-
havior of policemen turns out to be simply an instance of a much
more general pattern in the conditions under which the law acts upon
social life. We thereby add systematically to existing knowledge of this
pattern, and, what is more, we can explain the behavior of the police,
since it can be predicted and deduced from a more general proposition
about law.52 If the likelihood of legal control is greater where other
forms of social control are absent, it follows that the police are more
likely to arrest a stranger who, let us say, assaults a stranger than a son
who assaults his father. To be able to explain something so mundane
49. Black, The Social Organization of Arrest, 23 STAN. L. REv. 1037, 1107 (1971).
50. Id. at 1107-08 nn.30-34.
51. Id. at 1108.
52. For a discussion of this type of explanation, see R. BitrIwArrE, SCaIENTFIC Ex-
PLANATION: A STUDY OF THE FUNcrION OF TiEoRY, PRoBABImTY AND LAW IN SCIviNC (1953).
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and microscopic as behavior in a police encounter with the same propo-
sition that we use to explain the historical emergence of law itself is
exciting and encouraging. It provides a glimpse of general theory in
action. This kind of theoretical structure is built up and elaborated
over time through a process of give-and-take between data and tenta-
tive propositions stated at a high level of abstraction. It is the classical
pattern of scientific advance, and I cannot see why the sociology of
law should be any less ambitious or any less rigorous.
VI
We should be clear about the relation between sociological and legal
scholarship. There is, properly speaking, no conflict of professional
jurisdiction between the two. A legal problem is a problem of value
and is forever beyond the reach of sociology. Jurisdictional conflict
arises only when the sociologist makes policy recommendations in the
name of science: In matters of legal policy, the lawyer must rely on
his own wits.
But a more significant matter than jurisdictional clarity is the rela-
tion between pure and applied sociology of law. My view, hardly novel,
is that the quality of applied science depends upon the quality of pure
science. Just as major advances in mechanical and chemical engineer-
ing have been made possible by theoretical formulations in pure
physics and chemistry, so legal engineering ultimately requires a gen-
eral theory of how legal systems behave as natural phenomena. The
case for a pure sociology of law does not rest solely on its social use-
fulness, but if utility is at issue, then in the long run the type of work
I advocate is crucial. At present, applied sociology of law has little to
apply. What more serious claim could be brought against it?
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